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Summary: The US’s large and growing current account (or ‘external’) deficit, together 
with its significant government budget (or ‘internal’) deficit, has begun to place real limits 
on future US growth. Is current US growth sustainable in light of these ‘twin’ current 
account and government budget deficits? (Derived from, and based upon, a presentation 
given at the Casa de América in Madrid on 28 February 2005 in the Seminar ‘Tendencies 
in US Policies for the Next Four Years’) 
 
 
US Growth and the ‘Twin Deficits’: Are They Sustainable? 
 
Economic growth in the US has been relatively impressive during the last two years and is 
now moving forward at about 3.5% a year. While employment growth has been the weak 
leg in the US recovery from the 2001 recession, there are some recent if not yet altogether 
conclusive signs that employment may be picking up again in a broad and sustainable 
fashion. Nevertheless, the US’s large and growing current account (or ‘external’) deficit, 
together with its significant government budget (or ‘internal’) deficit, has begun to place 
real limits on future US growth. 
 
Is current US growth sustainable in light of these ‘twin’ current account and government 
budget deficits? If these deficits themselves are sustainable, then, yes, we would conclude 
that US growth is also currently unfolding upon a stable foundation –at least in the short 
and middle run–. Perhaps it would be easier then to ask whether or not the current account 
deficit itself is sustainable? Unfortunately, our answer is no. Once this is established, the 
only real questions that remain to be answered are: (1) at how high a level –and for how 
long– can the external deficit be maintained? Put in other words, when will the inevitable 
correction begin? Will the adjustment occur within George Bush’s second presidential 
term? Or only after the next presidential election? Furthermore, (2) what will be the 
consequences of this ultimate readjustment of the current account? Will the correction be 
severe or mild? Will the US –and the world– economy experience a significant recession, 
or a mere soft landing? Finally, (3) what will be the implications for US domestic and 
foreign policies, and for the economic and political responses from the rest of the world? 
 
The Scope and Nature of the External Deficit 
In 2004 the US’s trade deficit finished the year at a record US$612bn, while the current 
account deficit (a slightly broader account of the external position) ended up at US$670bn, 
or some 5.7% of GDP. This was the largest absolute and relative level of external deficit 
registered by any advanced economy in recent times. Meanwhile, the government’s fiscal 
deficit, even during a year of strong economic growth, came in at US$412bn (or 3.6% of 
GDP), much of which was the result of the Bush administration’s tax cuts enacted during 
the previous years. An increasing amount of debate now revolves around the causes of 
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these deficits and their implications, not only because of their unprecedented nature and 
international reach, but also because each particular explanation implies a very distinct set 
of conclusions for US and international policy. 
 
Some analysts have focused on the ‘twin’ nature of the deficits, arguing that loose fiscal 
policy directly feeds the current account deficit by stimulating consumption growth and 
imports. Beyond that, however, government borrowing to finance the fiscal deficit 
increasingly has been forced to rely on foreign savings channelled to the US by foreign 
investors whose ongoing interest receipts not only make the US fiscal burden heavier but 
also constitute outflows on the current account in the future, contributing to an ever wider 
external deficit. Meanwhile, the widening current account deficit requires –and, it is hoped, 
will continue to attract– ever more inward finance, which is easily channelled into US 
government debt, either through the primary market (increasing the fiscal burden) or 
through the secondary markets (keeping interest rates relatively low and further 
encouraging ever more consumption and imports). This argument, therefore, focuses on 
the need to reduce US government deficits and borrowing, a primary cause, in its view, of 
the external deficit. Of course, this is an uncomfortable conclusion for many Americans, as 
it implies the need to either raise taxes or cut spending, both of which are politically 
sensitive propositions. Either or both such policies would certainly imply slower growth 
for the US, possibly provoke political backlashes from distinct and competing 
constituencies and unleash a bloody political fight over the direction of US foreign policy, 
its financing, and the prioritisation of the concomitant sacrifices. 
 
Others experts question the link between the two deficits, arguing that fiscal deficits and 
current account deficits have not always moved in parallel in recent history.1 Furthermore, 
this argument also claims that the primary cause of the US current account deficit is the 
relative attractiveness that the US economy offers to foreign investors channelling 
international savings. The buoyant US economy, superior to other major economies in 
terms of productivity growth and expected future returns, therefore acts as a magnet for 
world savings, keeping, in turn, US interest rates low and feeding US consumption which, 
for its part, serves as the world’s only stable growth engine.2 While this view concedes that 
US fiscal policy should be gradually, if prudently, restrained, it also places more emphasis 
elsewhere, primarily on the imperative for other major economies to make essential 
adjustments to increase their own domestic demand and reduce their level of excess 
savings, so as to take on some of the burden for world growth. 
 
This view attempts to deflect the debate away from the fiscal and foreign policies of the 
Bush administration and instead focuses upon the economic and foreign policies of Europe 
and Asia. According to this view, Europe still requires significant economic reform in 
order to make its economy more flexible and, therefore, capable of generating more 
domestic demand and imports from the US. Asia, for its part, must allow its exchange rates 
to appreciate in order to take pressure off the US trade deficit. This point of view sees it as 
misguided to focus on Bush’s fiscal and foreign policies as the main factors behind US 
deficits –after all, the US has shouldered the twin burden of providing demand for an 
anaemic world economy and essential security for the world system–. Instead, the primary 
problem resides in the misguided policies of Europe and Asia that undermine domestic 
demand and force these economies to rely upon US-supported export growth. Such a view 
places the burden for the more difficult and challenging political adjustments on those who 
generate the world’s excess savings. 
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On the other hand, both schools of thought –while differing significantly in the evaluation 
as to the immediacy of the coming adjustment– do acknowledge that an adjustment, or 
some sort, will need to take place. While there are also different views on the most likely 
pattern of adjustment –smooth and relatively painlessly versus abrupt and potentially 
messy– there is, nevertheless, a consensus on the need for the dollar to depreciate further. 
The real effective exchange rate of the dollar has depreciated between 15% and 20% since 
its last peak in 2002, but there is broad agreement that for the current account deficit to 
decline to more sustainable levels (between 2.5% and 3% of GDP), a further 15% to 30% 
real effective depreciation will be required.3 Because the dollar has already depreciated 
significantly against the currencies of most advanced economies, including a partial 
correction against the Japanese yen, this means that the most efficient dollar depreciation 
should occur against the export-sensitive currencies of continental Asia, particularly the 
Chinese yuan.4 However, many do acknowledge the potential for currency overshooting, 
even against the export-sensitive euro, making this process of adjustment highly politically 
charged and technically tricky. 
 
Nevertheless, the current account deficit remains a palpable and daily fact –and there are 
no clear signs that the dollar depreciation that has occurred to date has made the slightest 
impact upon it–.5 The most recent monthly trade deficit figures from the US show the 
deficit reaching record levels, on track to finish 2005 well over US$700bn. Some analysts, 
like those at the OECD, have estimated recently that the external deficit could reach 
US$900bn (or 6.7% of GDP) in 2006.6 One comment that has constantly been made in the 
press –to underline the scale of the external deficit and the foreign financing needed to 
maintain it– has been the need for the US economy to import over US$1.8bn of capital 
everyday. On an average net basis this is true. However, even this oft-repeated fact 
deserves some closer inspection, for it hides from view the fact that, in gross terms, the US 
must import at least US$3.6bn a day. If we think further in terms of only working days, the 
net requirement is nearly US$2.8bn per day, far more than the figure so often repeated. 
 
Furthermore, the level of US net external obligations (or its net international investment 
position, generated from past accumulation of current account deficits) is now estimated to 
be over US$3 trillion, or approaching 30% of GDP.7 The resulting net outflow of interest, 
dividend and other profit payments on these obligations is now estimated to be equivalent 
to about 30% of the current account deficit every year, and this is likely to continue to 
grow. Even should the trade deficit remain constant in relation to GDP, current net external 
obligations will have to be paid (and financed as well), a process which by itself would 
widen the current account deficit over time. The OECD has estimated that even ongoing 
deficits of only 3% of GDP –about half the current levels– would bring the US net 
international investment position (or NIIP) to 40% of GDP by 2010, eventually stabilising 
at about 63%. Should the external deficit remain at current levels, the OECD estimates that 
the NIIP would reach 50% of GDP by 2010 and eventually 100%. Our own estimates –
which correspond to those of many other economists– are that, assuming 4% growth in the 
US economy indefinitely into the future, along with current trade deficit levels, the NIIP 
will reach some 57% of GDP by the end of 2008.8 The growing fear is that international 
investors will become increasingly sceptical about continuing to finance a US current 
account deficit that is feeding an unsustainable rise in US net external obligations, 
provoking a severe dollar crash, a subsequent spike in US interest rates and a painful world 
recession. 
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The Sources of the Deficit 
But what exactly is generating the current account deficit? Or, to put the question another 
way, is the required foreign borrowing financing investment or consumption? And is such 
borrowing being undertaken by private or public agents? At the height of the 1990s boom 
(mid-1998), the US current account deficit remained a modest 1.5% of GDP. But as the 
boom progressed and the external deficit grew, the latter was being generated by an 
increase in investment spending. Meanwhile, the primary agents behind the necessary 
borrowing were private sector actors. Public savings actually increased, as the 
government’s budget was moving into surplus. According to the so-called Lawson 
Doctrine –which identified a current account deficit as dangerously unsustainable only if it 
were generated by excessive consumption spending and financed by government 
borrowing– there was no particular problem with the growing US current account deficit in 
the 1990s –just as Nigel Lawson himself saw no great danger in the British current account 
deficit during the mid-1990s9–. Catherine Mann, a senior fellow at the Institute for 
International Economics in Washington, and an expert in the dynamics of the US current 
account, has likened such foreign borrowing on the part of the US during the 1990s to the 
astute student who takes out student loans to pay for tuition and buys books with a credit 
card. It is the investment nature of the spending in question –at least theoretically capable 
of contributing to a future stream of income much higher than in its absence– which 
justifies the increased indebtedness required to finance it. 
 
However, this decade’s US external deficit has acquired an entirely different, and more 
questionable, character. The macroeconomic policy responses to the recession of 2001, 
including the rapid drop in interest rates to the lowest levels in half a century, along with 
the rapid deterioration of the government’s budget surplus (some 2% of GDP) into a large 
and growing deficit (nearly 4% of GDP), not only transformed the nature of the spending 
financed by the US’s foreign borrowing, but also changed the quality of this borrowing 
itself.10 When investment spending collapsed in the wake of the bubble, consumption 
remained strong, in response to cheap money and easy mortgage refinancing. Meanwhile, 
as a result of the Bush administration’s three successive tax cuts (2001, 2002 and 2003), 
the government became the economy’s largest net borrower, dwarfing the impact of 
borrowing from the private sector that was instead busily rebuilding balance sheets and 
increasing the level of net private corporate savings. Furthermore, the current account 
deficit, traditionally expected to move down towards balance during a slowdown or 
recession, did not adjust at all. On the contrary, it continued to increase relative to the 
GDP, moving from 4.5% in 2000 to 5.7% in 2004 Furthermore, the unrestrained tendency 
to borrow from abroad was no longer generated by strong levels of productive investment 
spending but rather by private household and (increasingly) government consumption. 
Mann likens this behaviour to that of the carefree student who drops out of school and 
decides to pass the time on a Caribbean beach instead, putting all such expenses on his 
credit card. 
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But as the Fed continued to keep interest rates depressed at historically low levels, 
consumers were able to continue financing their consumption binge by borrowing against 
inflated asset values. The boom in housing prices, unleashed by the Fed’s historic cheap 
money policy, allowed for at least three successive waves of mortgage refinancing, 
producing fresh wads of cash for consumption spending. Nevertheless, the increased debt 
level implied by mortgage refinancing would remain fixed, even despite a future likely 
drop off in housing prices, once consumers –or bank lenders– lost their nerve and refused 
to continue to borrow and buy –and certainly once the Fed began to raise interest rates 
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again–. Therefore, we liken such borrowing behaviour, increasing the current account 
deficit still further, not to the drop-out who would merely finance his Caribbean holiday on 
credit, but more to the drop-out who not only uses his credit card to get him to Vegas, but 
also to stake his gambling spree. 
 
But the true nature of the US current account deficit is even scarier. The current account 
has moved from 1.5% to nearly 6% of GDP in seven years, while the fiscal position has 
slipped from a 2% surplus to a deficit of over 4% of GDP in even less time. The current 
account, while widening, has transformed from an investment to a consumption affair, 
while the principal borrower has changed from the private sector –presumably bound to 
make the correct decisions within the context of a functioning market– to the state. 
Furthermore, while it is clear that foreign ownership of US assets is becoming increasingly 
pronounced –foreigners owned only 20% of outstanding US Treasuries in 1990, compared 
with nearly 50% today– it is less and less the foreign private sector that has continued to 
extend fresh funds to the US. While inward flows of private FDI have softened noticeably 
(from US$300bn in 2000 to US$30bn in 2003 and US$100bn in 2004), official –or public– 
foreign financing of the US current account deficit has largely taken over from the private 
sector. During the last two years, upwards of 80% of the US current account deficit was 
financed by the reserve intervention policies of the world’s central banks, with Asian 
central banks alone contributing as much as 80% of this (or some 60% of the total). 
China’s central bank alone financed nearly a third of the US current account deficit in 
2004. 
 
So borrowing to finance investment has become borrowing to finance consumption. 
Private consumers, meanwhile, have been joined by the government in the borrowing and 
spending binge. Crucially, however, private sector lenders have increasingly abandoned 
the field –even as US growth rates have bounced to above 4% in 2003 and 2004, after the 
doldrums of 2001 and 2002– and ceded the terrain to official public actors, principally the 
world’s central banks. What is more, the bulk of this new official-sector lending is 
concentrated in Asia. While much of this financing has been extended by the US’s 
strategic allies (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan), by far the most dynamic central bank 
lender has become China, a rival that the US frequently accuses of unfair and manipulative 
trade practices, widespread human rights violations, aggressive bullying of its neighbours 
and behaviour which, when it does not condone international terrorism, certainly does not 
help to eliminate it. To make matters even worse, central banks have recently begun to 
diversify the types of assets in which they invest their growing reserves. While US treasury 
bills and bonds have traditionally been the asset of choice for reserve managers, there is 
evidence of a recent shift towards other less traditional forms of debt, like agency paper or 
–even more disconcerting– higher yield, higher risk assets like US mortgage-backed 
securities. So the Chinese authorities, by way of financing the US current account deficit, 
are now investing in the US housing market bubble… what next? 
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This scenario is even more unstable than that of the dropout cut loose in the casinos of Las 
Vegas with only his credit card. He has now exceeded his traditional credit limits and 
squandered all of this available credit at the roulette wheel. Rather than quitting and 
getting a job so as to generate income to pay down his debt, he has borrowed still more 
money on the black market from the Mob. While the interest rates he is forced to pay 
remain lower than with the typical loan shark, this is only because he has befriended that 
Mafioso’s son who is secretly lending him funds drained from his father’s accounts, so that 
our friend can continue to feed his bad habits at the casinos. Short of a miracle, can this 
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story end in any other way but bad? It is true that the nature of the relative power relations 
between our gambler (the US) and his new found unconventional creditor (China) are 
more balanced and symbiotic than in this simplified example. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
the scale and nature of US spending and borrowing has undergone a profound 
transformation that will have important implications for world macroeconomic stability 
and international geopolitics. 
 
Apologies for US Deficits 
 
Throughout 2004, economist after economist warned of the unsustainable nature of US 
deficits. Robert Rubin, Larry Summers, Kenneth Rogoff, Wynn Godley, Stephen Roach, 
Martin Wolf, Fred Bergsten and Catherine Mann are just a few of those who have 
attempted to sound the warning.11 Former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker even declared that 
there was, by late 2004, a 75% chance of a dollar crisis within the next five years. The IMF 
has also warned of the same dangers in its official publications, both in 2004 and 2005, 
advocating immediate fiscal policy tightening in the US and arguing that the recent Bush 
tax cuts threaten to undermine the economy’s fiscal solvency and possibly a dollar crisis.12 
The OECD recently contributed to the warning, publishing its forecast in May that the US 
current account deficit would continue to rise in 2005 (to 6.4% pf GDP) and 2006 (to 
6.7%), and calling on the ECB to lower interest rates so as to stimulate Euro area domestic 
demand to help check this dangerous trend. 
 
Even Alan Greenspan acknowledged, in the fall of 2004, that the current account deficit 
could not be expected to continue to widen indefinitely without repercussions: foreign 
investors’ appetite could easily begin to wane. Greenspan’s apparent confirmation of what 
by last November had become an increasingly loud chorus of warnings from a wide range 
of respected economists and economic commentators set off a dollar slide which became 
especially pronounced in the last days of December and early days of January. Not only 
did the euro rise to nearly US$1.36, but most other major world currencies –with the key 
exception of the Chinese Yuan– also registered notable appreciation. This dollar 
depreciation combined with news of record US deficits in 2004 to provoke a string of 
analyses in early 2005 which take issue with the most alarmist version of the story (most 
clearly represented by Nouriel Roubini of NYU and his colleague, Brad Setser) and bring 
into question the severity of the US external deficit and the likelihood of a disruptive 
adjustment process leading to a hard landing. 
 
Some of the most sophisticated responses have come from important figures at the US 
Federal Reserve, including Greenspan himself, Ben Bernanke and Roger W. Ferguson, 
Jr.13 These analyses, although slightly different in their emphases, argue that the US 
current account deficit is not as destabilising as many presume. Briefly put, they argue that 
structural changes in the global economy tend to allow US deficits to grow to a larger 
degree than has traditionally been believed feasible or sustainable. What is more, these 
structural changes provide mechanisms which will likely make the ultimate adjustment of 
the current account deficit gradual and orderly. 
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Greenspan’s talk, while touching upon the arguments which have subsequently been 
picked up his colleagues, focused on the imminence of the adjustment to the trade deficit 
which he saw as just around the corner by the end of 2004. His argument, when answering 
the question as to why the current account deficit had continued to widen despite the 
significant dollar decline against most of the currencies from the developed world 
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(particularly the euro, the pound sterling and the other ‘Commonwealth’ currencies) since 
early 2002, was that foreign exporters had been squeezing the profit margins in 2002 and 
2003 so as to maintain US market share. Such behaviour, which repressed the exchange 
rate pass-through effect on the dollar prices of US imports, had short-circuited the current 
account adjustment process stemming from dollar depreciation. He nevertheless saw 
evidence of this process coming to an end during 2004, as foreign exporters began to 
abandon such a strategy as profit margins reached the low limit of sustainability. This 
change would presumably mean that higher profit margins for foreign exporters would 
lead to higher US import prices. Nevertheless, it would appear that such an argument 
would imply that: (1) the normal J-curve dynamic had not yet begun to play itself out, 
implying even further delays in the current account adjustment; and (2) only further dollar 
depreciation against these currencies would produce the desired pass-through effect and 
resulting downward adjustment of US imports. The open question is, however, not only 
whether the dollar should decline further against these ‘Western’ currencies, but also 
whether it will.14
 
The arguments of Ben Bernanke and Roger Ferguson are more varied, but coalesce around 
the claim that the US current account deficit stems not from the US budget deficit, or a 
growing shortage of US savings, but overwhelmingly from a savings glut in rest of the 
world as a result of insufficient domestic demand in other economies, from the significant 
productivity growth differential between the US and others, and from globalisation’s 
impact on reducing the home bias of international investors (who now bring their funds to 
the US market more readily than in the past). This boils down to the claim that the US 
external deficit has become so large by relative and historical standards not because of 
excessively imprudent US spending and indebtedness but rather because of the enormous 
attraction that the US economy holds for international capital flows in the context of open 
and globalised capital markets and weak domestic demand in the rest of the world. 
 
The basic conclusion of these arguments coming from the Fed representatives is that the 
unprecedented nature of US deficits should not give cause for unprecedented levels of 
concern. We are simply operating on a level of economic reality with no historical 
precedent and therefore past criteria do not hold the same relevance that they might once 
have had. One of the important implications of this position is that the growing US budget 
deficit plays little if any role in the growing current account deficit. Indeed, the claim is 
made that even if the budget deficit were eliminated tomorrow, this would have only a 
marginal impact on the current account position. Part of the argument here is that 
government dissavings since 2000 have not crowded out net exports but rather private 
spending (private consumption and business investment) and have been to a large degree 
offset by a build-up in private savings. The implication here is that without the Bush fiscal 
expansion, the build-up in private savings would not have taken place and the continued 
private spending trends would have bloated the current account deficit to nearly the same 
current levels. The upshot is that the culprit is not Bush’s fiscal policy at all –although all 
the Fed authors are careful to claim that fiscal consolidation would still be positive, but on 
other independent grounds– but rather the changes wrought by economic globalisation and 
the varying degrees of ease (the US economy) and strain (Europe, for example) which 
different economies around that world have experienced in adjusting to such changes. 
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One is still uncomfortable with this line of argumentation, however. First, the build-up in 
private savings was mainly a corporate phenomenon which occurred primarily in 2001 
during the fallout of the boom (stock market decline, dot.com crash and corporate 
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scandals) as companies sought to shore up their balance sheets. The build-up in private 
household savings has been minimal and levels remain historically low (in February 
Greenspan said the personal savings rate was 1%, although in April Ferguson claimed it 
was less than 2%). Furthermore, the private sector savings rate (including both 
corporations and households), after recovering somewhat during the recession to just under 
15% of GDP, has been constant since 2002 –according to the very same data used by the 
Fed simulation study cited by Ferguson– even as the budget deficit and the current account 
deficits have continued to widen. 
 
Do we really believe that without the growth in the budget deficit both private households 
and corporations would have continued to save less and to go further into debt, thus 
maintaining US growth and the expansion of the current account deficit? Or is it not more 
plausible that without the fiscal and monetary expansions since 2001, private households 
and corporations would have contracted their spending even more and built up their 
savings to even higher levels, with the accompanying result being a steeper and longer 
recession?15 A steeper and longer recession no doubt would have had a corrective effect on 
the current account deficit. Could it be that if the current account deficit is to be 
sustainable at higher levels than previously imagined, and for longer periods of time, this 
would ultimately depend on maintaining US growth at high levels, based on the mirage of 
unsustainable fiscal and monetary expansions? Now that the monetary expansion is 
subsiding, can US growth continue at such buoyant rates? Can fiscal expansion continue, 
and can it be sufficient to continue to underpin growth, particularly in light of the potential 
impact of monetary tightening on the housing market and levels of household 
consumption? Could it possibly be that case, as Bernanke and Ferguson imply, that if 
indeed the budget deficit were to be eliminated tomorrow, the effect on the current account 
deficit would be nil? Why would this be so? Because the private sector (who? households? 
corporations?) will suddenly kick in with a renewed burst of spending and a concomitant 
draw down in the private savings rate? Were not the Bush tax cuts –arguably responsible 
for much of the fiscal deterioration– justified as a way to stimulate both consumption and 
investment spending? Would a reversal of the Bush tax cuts or a significant slashing of 
public spending stimulate corporations and households to spend more? 
 
We find this difficult to believe, to say the least. Either growth will have to subside, taking 
pressure off the external deficit, or the external deficit will eventually provoke a 
slowdown, soft or hard. Monetary policy has begun to tighten, sensibly, even if it means 
potential economic pain. At least, prudence in the face of potential renewed inflationary 
pressures has held the day. Will the administration follow suit with fiscal policy in the face 
of potential limitations on the horizon? In the end, these Fed-based analyses seem to 
assume that the growth pattern of the US since 2000 would have been the same with or 
without fiscal and monetary expansion and that therefore macroeconomic policy has had 
no impact on the external deficit. This would appear to ignore the reality of the cleansing 
effects of recession –after a period of borrowing excess– that lay the foundation for a 
sustained period of stable growth in the next phase of the cycle. If we can indeed ignore 
this assumption, then we are truly well into virgin territory. But remember that technology 
did not, in the end, slay the double-headed dragon of inflation and the economic cycle. Are 
we really to believe that globalisation has now deactivated the limits that external deficits 
place on growth? Talk of new paradigms is typically a dangerous sign that a long cycle is 
about to break. 
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However, there is an aspect of these arguments from the Fed that does seem credible. If the 
whitewashing of the role of fiscal and monetary policy seems questionable, the arguments 
concerning the rest of the world should not be ignored completely. Pointing to the role that 
growth and productivity differentials play in creating a bias towards current account 
deficits and surpluses is useful in that it clarifies the role that other economies have in the 
development of the world’s current macroeconomic imbalances and thus implicates them 
in contributing to a smooth adjustment process. This is particularly important should 
global economic coordination prove necessary to minimise the global impacts of the 
adjustment process and if there is to be any chance of equitably distributing the resulting 
policy and economic burdens. However, this positive effect is undermined by the 
insistence that US macroeconomic policy has had, and continues to have, no necessary role 
to play in this process. 
 
There is also another set of arguments that has recently surfaced to minimise the 
importance that many place on the scale of the current account deficit and the risks of a 
hard landing for the dollar. These arguments focus on the potentially dangerous build up of 
net external obligations that the US economy must carry as a result of lasting and growing 
external deficits. The estimates of the OECD mentioned above, for example, that foresee 
the US’s negative NIIP quickly moving beyond 50% of GDP and even to 100% in the 
future suggest that even the normally attractive US economy might begin to lose its allure 
to foreign investors, who are likely to become increasingly wary of the continued 
sustainability of growing current account deficits and the potential for a dollar rout. 
 
A new school of thought –while not dealing directly with the role of US fiscal deficits– 
argues that if we account for the effects of dollar depreciation on US-held foreign assets, 
the deterioration in the NIIP as a result of continued current account deficits is not as 
severe as one would think from the calculations of the NIIP using the historic book value 
of assets. As a result, while the current account would adjust as a result of dollar 
depreciation, adjustment would also occur via the financial channel as depreciation 
increased the dollar value of US foreign assets dominated in other currencies. This could 
possibly imply that the level of dollar depreciation required for sustainable adjustment 
would be less significant than traditionally assumed, allowing the sustainable current 
account deficit to be higher than previously thought. Some have therefore argued that the 
euro, for example, need not fall any further to achieve adequate adjustment against the 
dollar.16
 
Such an argument might be valid in the case of a current account adjustment through a 
gradual depreciation of the dollar, similar to that which has occurred against the euro. The 
implication is only that the negative NIIP will grow more gradually than previously 
assumed with any particular level of current account deficit, and that the dollar adjustment 
necessary will be less intense, allowing for a sustainable level of the current account deficit 
to be higher than previously imagined. This might make sense for analysis of euro-dollar 
dynamics, suggesting that the dollar has depreciated sufficiently against the euro and that 
the US-European bilateral current account has, or will, adjust to sustainable levels. But it 
says nothing about the principal drivers of the current account deficit –the position vis-à-
vis Asia–. Asian currencies on the whole have only adjusted in a minor way against the 
dollar, and the current account deficit vis-à-vis Asia continues to grow. 
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As we will see below, this situation is maintained, at least in part, by the fixing of the yuan 
against the weaker dollar, and the desire of most Asian economies to attempt to limit their 
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currency appreciation. To do this has required large-scale currency intervention and a 
recycling of Asia’s dollar reserves to the US, financing US fiscal and current account 
deficits. The arguments of both the Fed representatives and this NIIP school of thought 
assume that private foreign investors continue to view US assets as superior to those in 
other economies and therefore are willing to finance much higher US deficits for much 
longer periods of time than in the past. However, both sets of arguments ignore the fact 
that in recent years official state actors –central banks– have largely taken over from 
private investors the role of financing US deficits. In this context, it is difficult to argue 
that US deficits are sustainable –ie, will not provoke a growth slowdown– or that that 
correction will be necessarily orderly and mild. If foreign central banks decide to slow the 
rate of dollar accumulation and investment in US assets, the correction could be severe. 
And if private investors can see what central banks see, there is little reason to believe that 
they would step in to fill the gap –regardless of the arguments that in the long-run the 
superiority of the US economy and capital markets will continue to attract, all other things 
being equal, world savings–. 
 
Nevertheless, there are also those who argue that US borrowing from Asian central banks 
to finance consumption keeps Asia expanding on the basis of export-led growth which, in 
its turn, generates the excess savings and therefore the capacity to finance US 
consumption. This symbiotic relationship is deemed by those who defend it not only to be 
beneficial but also sustainable –at least the middle run, if not in the long run–. Indeed, for 
such voices this relationship represents, once again, a new paradigm in which many of our 
traditional criteria for external deficit sustainability simply do not apply. 
 
New Paradigm or a Balance of Financial Terror? 
 
As the dollar has weakened under the weight of the US current account and government 
budget deficits, many voices in the US (and some in Europe) have called for the 
revaluation of the ‘undervalued’ yuan. The claim –widespread among the US political 
elite– that the Chinese are engaging in outright ‘currency manipulation’ by actively 
maintaining an undervalued exchange rate has gained in credence and plausibility –
particularly among US middle class voters– as the Chinese bilateral trade surplus with the 
US (now some US$170bn and nearly a third of the overall US trade deficit) continues to 
grow and as manufacturing employment in the US fails to recover convincingly. 
 
Official US pressures on the Chinese to revalue, spearheaded by Secretary of the Treasury 
John Snow and echoed by the G7’s periodic declarations, were particularly intense during 
2003. Most US estimates claim that the yuan remained 10% to 25% undervalued. Many 
voices even called for a quick and complete liberalisation of China’s capital account and 
an immediate free float of the yuan. In 2004, however, such pressures largely subsided as it 
became apparent that the simple, radical solution advocated by the Bush Administration 
could not realistically be expected from the Chinese authorities, nor could it be considered 
a problem-free solution for the US. Grudgingly, as the presidential election campaign 
unfolded, it was quietly recognised within Bush circles that the Chinese currency 
intervention required to prevent yuan appreciation was also providing the key external 
financing for the growing budget and current account deficits (particularly after the 
Japanese terminated their large-scale currency intervention in April 2004) and was perhaps 
even providing for a significant, if invisible, subsidy to US consumption. 
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Asian Reserve Accumulation 
While the US continues to import large volumes of Asian manufactured imports –
facilitated by a dollar unable to depreciate against the yuan and many other Asian 
currencies– the concomitant Asian reserve accumulation has been to a large degree 
invested in US Treasuries –at least up to the present– providing a key flow of external 
financing for the growing budget and current account deficits. While total world foreign 
exchange reserves nearly doubled from US$2,290bn at the end of 2000 to approximately 
US$4,000bn at the end of 2004, well over half of this accumulation has occurred in Asia. 
Asia now holds nearly two-thirds of global foreign exchange reserves (some US$2,660), 
and most of this is found in East Asia. The People’s Bank of China alone increased its 
reserves by over US$200bn in 2004, financing nearly a third of the US current account 
deficit. China’s foreign exchange reserves now total US$610 (or roughly 40% of GDP). 
Some 75% to 80% of these reserves are estimated to be held in US Treasuries. China’s rate 
of increased reserve accumulation rose from 5% on a year-on-year basis in 2000 to some 
50% by the end of 2004. 
 
This Asian reserve accumulation accounted for some 75% of US current account financing 
in 2003 and over 60% in 2004 and for nearly 80% of the financing of the US fiscal deficit 
in these years.17 This has also arguably helped to keep long-run interest rates in the US 
lower than they might otherwise have been, providing even more stimulus to the US 
economy than the Fed’s low short-term rates. This support to the US debt market, along 
with the resulting downward pressure on interest rates, in turn, has reduced US savings 
still further, fed the housing market boom and stimulated the consumption which continues 
to drive US purchases of Asian exports. 
 
Bretton Woods II 
This pattern of behaviour –with the Chinese fixing their exchange rate against the dollar, 
and other Asian countries demonstrating a ‘fear of floating’ through the accumulation of 
dollar reserves, along with continued US government deficit spending, ever-growing 
external deficits and the maintenance of a strong consumption boom in the US– has 
created a symbiotic trade and financial relationship between the US and Asia which has 
been dubbed the new Bretton Woods II by a group of Deutsche Bank analysts.18 During the 
second half of 2004, the pros and cons of such a new Bretton Woods II scenario, its 
sustainability and ultimate demise, along with related consequences, have been hotly 
contested in what has shaped up to be one of the most central contemporary debates on the 
international economy. 
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The sustained export-led Asian boom, facilitated by relatively stable exchange rates –ie, 
‘riding the dollar down’, which implies even more competitive exchange rates vis-à-vis the 
euro and the other ‘Western’ currencies as the dollar weakens– has interacted with loose 
US fiscal and monetary policy in the wake of the 2001 recession to generate pronounced 
macroeconomic imbalances at the international level. Rapid Chinese growth, driven by 
export expansion –obviously facilitated by a yuan which is not allowed to appreciate 
against the otherwise weakening dollar– has been considered essential by Chinese 
authorities as an engine of employment for the millions of new job seekers every year. 
This imperative creates the necessity to acquire dollar reserves which then need to be 
invested. Recycling dollars back into the US economy helps to finance US imports from 
the Chinese as well as to place downward pressure on long-term interest rates. Such 
financing –an indirect interest rate subsidy– fuels the US consumption that propels the US 
economy forward and underpins Asian job-creating exports to the US. Asian savings 
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therefore are, in the end, too high. This is expressed in the form of growing Asian trade 
surpluses with the US. US savings are, on the other hand, further encouraged to be too 
low, and this shortfall is made visible in the ‘twin’ (budget and current account) deficits, 
which reveal the extent to which the US has become dependent on external finance to 
maintain its excessive levels of consumption. 
 
The argument underlying the position that this Bretton Woods II arrangement is both 
sustainable and beneficial posits that both Asians and Americans have clear interests in 
perpetuating this symbiotic relationship. According to this view, Asian countries, 
particularly China, must maintain high rates of growth to generate sufficient employment 
for the millions made redundant by privatisation and the millions more engaging in rural-
urban migration in search of higher money wages. For China alone this means generating 
some 15 to 20 million new paying jobs every year. This translates into a political 
imperative for the Chinese regime that must strive to maintain as much social stability and 
consensus as possible –regardless of whether or not the true goal of the ruling Communist 
Party is to affect a gradual transition to market democracy–. 
 
Furthermore, the Chinese authorities have already clearly stated –repeatedly– that they 
view an open and liberalised capital account, along with a free-floating exchange rate, as 
one of the ultimate goals of the market transition. Nevertheless, they have also clearly 
explained that movement towards such a goal will be gradual and carefully sequenced so 
as not to undermine economic and financial stability. Aside from the pressing social and 
political imperative to keep employment growing rapidly for years to come, the most 
sensitive economic issue is related to the challenging task of cleaning up and modernising 
the financial system and liberalising capital flows. 
 
The Chinese financial system is indeed ill-prepared to deal with flexible exchange rate. 
Because interest rates are still predominantly state-controlled, there are no on-shore 
forward (or other currency derivatives) markets to allow exporters to hedge exposure to the 
unpredictable swings of flexible exchange rates. Furthermore, Standard & Poor’s estimates 
that well over 40% of all loans in the banking sector are non-performing. A yuan 
revaluation would inflate the value of these non-performing loans, while deflating the 
value of the US$45bn in US treasuries which were injected into two major state banks in 
January 2004 as well as the other foreign reserve assets held within the Chinese banking 
system. Such effects, coming from the termination of the Chinese policy to hold the yuan 
stable against a weakening dollar, could easily unleash a wave of bankruptcies in the 
financial sector. 
 
The Chinese monetary authorities have also proved to be very reticent to revalue the yuan 
during periods of intense appreciation speculation. To do so would possibly ignite further 
speculative pressures, giving way to a distorting appreciating overshoot, exacerbating the 
debilitating impacts on the financial system. Revaluation would also disproportionately 
impact the earnings of foreign-invested exporters who constitute the most dynamic 
economic sector and the principal growth driver. 
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Therefore, one would expect the Chinese authorities to continue on their present course, 
following their slow but steady, selective liberalisation of the capital account. So far this 
has included the loosening of controls on certain inflows of foreign direct investment, but 
not all portfolio inflows and few if any capital outflows. This leads to another interesting 
ambiguity in the current debates over the supposedly ‘undervalued’ yuan. A completely 
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liberalised capital account could easily provoke net outflows of Yuan into the dollar by 
mainland Chinese economic actors who are currently not allowed to purchase or invest in 
foreign currencies. Such a result, easily feasible, would actually produce a sharp 
depreciation of the Yuan against the dollar, complicating any assumptions that further 
currency liberalisation in China will contribute to a reduction in the trade surplus with the 
US. As it is, last year a number of Chinese economists estimated that between US$30bn 
and US$40bn in illegal capital flows were leaving China every year. At the very least, such 
considerations cast doubt on the dominant assumption that the yuan is significantly 
undervalued, particularly once the speculative inflows come to a halt. 
 
For the US, such Asian behaviour, grounded in this particular perception of Asian 
imperatives, provides a guarantee, at least for a while, of sufficient external financing for 
the twin deficits, contributes to lower long-term interest rates, takes pressure off the US 
administration to reduce the budget deficit, allows for US savings to remain historically 
low and consumption to remain historically high, and for an imbalanced and vulnerable 
US growth pattern to be sustained. Such support to US consumption is also of extreme 
political utility for those running the US administration, as any form of economic 
slowdown, sparked by a significant dollar decline and realised through higher interest 
rates, or brought on by a noticeable reduction in the government budget deficit (from lower 
government spending, a rollback of some tax cuts, or both), would be perceived as 
politically dangerous for the Bush administration. 
 
Indeed, Chinese and US leaders both have a short-term political incentive to maintain this 
pattern of economic and financial arrangements. With it, they might continue to enjoy the 
rapid growth, strong consumption and robust employment that in China may prove 
essential to maintaining a social consensus in favour of the market transition even while 
the political system remains non-democratic, and that in the US will prove very useful for 
the Republicans at the next midterm Congressional elections in 2006 and the next 
Presidential elections in 2008. Advocates of this Bretton Woods II even argue that this 
arrangement is a constructive mechanism by which the developing periphery (China and 
Asia) can interact with the developed core (the US) to successfully develop, industrialise 
and bring hundreds of millions out of poverty. If we assume that there are no binding 
constraints upon the sustainability of such an implicit arrangement –beyond the 
willingness of the Chinese authorities to continue to accumulate dollar assets– these 
advocates argue that it is likely to continue functioning effectively for a decade or more, at 
which time there will no longer exist a pressing political or social need to generate 15 
million new wage-paying jobs a year in China.19
 
Nevertheless, as long as this so-called Bretton Woods II is maintained, the basic 
international macroeconomic imbalances upon which it is based will continue to deepen, 
increasing the risk of a system-threatening crisis and raising the costs of the ultimate 
economic adjustment that will ensue when finally this symbiotic relationship breaks down. 
What is more, the maintenance and magnification of such imbalances (the US current 
account deficit and overvalued dollar, significant accumulation of dollar reserves in Asia, 
particularly China, along with undervalued Asian currencies) will likely raise the economic 
costs that this system imposes, generate political opposition that may threaten to 
destabilise the Bretton Woods II arrangement long before its advocates foresee, and 
ultimately increase the severity of the ensuing crisis. 
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The Inherent Weaknesses of Bretton Woods II 
There are a number of economic and political pressures inherent to this arrangement that 
threaten to undermine it and magnify the consequences of its demise. First, there is an 
imminent danger to the world’s open trading system. The maintenance of the yuan peg to a 
dollar weakening against the other Western currencies cannot fail to contribute further to a 
still widening US trade deficit with China. Irrespective of the intellectual rigour of the 
argument, such a situation fuels the perception in the US that unfair Chinese economic 
practices are causing the US manufacturing base to contract and for US jobs to be 
eliminated and exported to, of all places, China, as more and more US firms invest or 
relocate abroad. If the yuan is perceived in the US to be unfairly undervalued, protectionist 
pressures, already significant, are bound to intensify, threatening the future of meaningful 
progress on regional trade accords and in the WTO-sponsored multilateral trade 
negotiations. Furthermore, protectionist pressures are also brewing in Europe, where the 
euro has appreciated upwards of 40% against the dollar and the Yuan –and significantly 
against the rest of Asia’s currencies– since 2002, bearing the brunt of dollar adjustment in 
the absence of Asian appreciation. Now the euro looks set to overshoot, threatening to 
damage Europe’s manufacturing base over the long run and dampen still further in the 
short run Europe’s weak export-sensitive growth. Perhaps the world could survive the 
demise of the current Doha Development Round. Widespread resort to protectionist 
practices, however, to say nothing of a trade war, could easily bring Bretton Woods II to 
an end, provoke a dollar crisis and bring on world recession. 
 
Already we are witnessing signs of protectionism in the US. After remaining nearly silent 
on the yuan’s exchange rate throughout 2004, Treasury Secretary John Snow has begun to 
speak of it again, in the wake of the recent G7 meeting at which China was warned of the 
risks of not moving immediately towards a more flexible exchange rate. The US Congress 
has also continued to move ever closer towards defining China’s exchange rate regime as 
illegal ‘currency manipulation,’ and imposing extraordinary tariff barriers on the import of 
Chinese products. A Senate bill is expected to be voted on by the end of July that would, if 
passed and confirmed into law, impose a 27.5% tariff on all Chinese goods unless the yuan 
is revalued within six months. Furthermore, pressures have emerged for China to engage in 
voluntary export restraints on textiles, particularly in the wake of the dismantling of the 
Multifibre agreements as of this year. It is curious that as soon as this trade distorting 
arrangement was finally scrapped at the insistence of the WTO, the US is now 
contemplating pushing China into a similar VER commitment, similar to that adopted by 
Japan with respect to automobiles in the 1980s. Some textile imports have increased by as 
much as 250% and 80% in the US and the EU, respectively, during the first quarter of 
2005. China has responded by implementing an export tax on textile imports, but recently 
has threatened to rescind this tax if the US and Europe continue to move towards 
implementing new extraordinary tariffs, which they claim are legal under the WTO’s 
safeguard provision against a ‘surge’ in imports. As a result, and despite the fact that the 
hourglass continues to run low on the Doha Round, international trade relations have not 
been as tense in a long time. 
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Second, continued reserve accumulation increases the risk that overheating will produce a 
hard landing for the Chinese economy and a recession in Asia, and possibly the world. 
Reserve accumulation feeds the tendencies –already pronounced in China– towards 
excessive bank lending and exacerbates inflationary pressures. Although China could 
potentially attempt to sterilise its currency interventions, as it has in the past, it is not clear 
that China will always have the necessary supply of domestic assets to drain off sufficient 
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liquidity to prevent excessive inflation. While it is true that inflation itself would imply a 
real appreciation of the yuan, and a potential correction of the bilateral surplus with the US 
over the long run, to choose such a strategy risks feeding, and then bursting, the many 
investment and property market bubbles already destabilising the Chinese economy. A 
hard landing would no doubt spill over into a financial crisis in China’s fragile banking 
sector, magnifying the recessionary impact. Given that some two percentage points of the 
world’s 5% growth in 2004 was generated by emerging Asia, an economic crisis in China 
would be felt the world over. While it appears that China has so far managed to avoid 
overheating and the hard landing fate, a sustained strategy of maintaining the yuan peg and 
accumulating dollars indefinitely into the future could easily upset this equilibrium in the 
future. 
 
There is also the risk that the other players –who admittedly have secondary roles– in this 
game will begin to change their supportive behaviour under the inherent pressures of 
BWII.20 Dollar reserve holders beyond Northeast Asia –including other Asian countries 
and the world’s energy exporters– will begin to slow their rate of reserve accumulation or 
at least begin to diversify their reserves away from the dollar. Indeed, there are already 
signs that these processes have begun.21 This would place additional downward pressure 
on the dollar and begin to reduce the value of dollar reserves, forcing more diversification 
and further downward pressure. The upshot would be that Europe would begin to 
experience more protectionist pressures in light of an even stronger euro and China and 
Japan, in particular, would be faced with the necessity of accumulating even more dollars. 
Without the tacit collaboration of these secondary actors, it will become even more 
difficult and risky for the two key reserve accumulators to continue to support the dollar. 
 
Finally, there is a growing risk that the perceived mutually beneficial Bretton Woods II 
arrangement –which has taken shape spontaneously as a result of ‘benign neglect’ of the 
US– transforms into a ‘balance of financial terror’. This would imply the US continuing to 
generate the world’s consumption upon an increasingly flimsy foundation of foreign debt 
solely to avoid the Chinese slowdown that would inevitably accompany a drop-off in US 
import demand. It would involve China continuing to accumulate dollar reserves and 
finance US deficits so as to avoid the likely slowdown that would be induced by the yuan 
appreciation that such a halt to reserve accumulation and US deficit financing would 
provoke.22 Both the US and China would be encouraged to maintain the current patterns of 
their economic behaviour simply to avoid provoking the economic crisis that such 
behaviour, at least temporarily, forestalls. This dark side of current US and Chinese policy 
presents the world with a particularly difficult ‘exit problem’. Even if protectionism does 
not break out, or the Chinese economy does not overheat into its own version of an 
emerging market crisis, the ‘balance of financial terror’ could easily break down into world 
crisis as a result of its inherently unstable nature. The unhappy fact is that there is no easy, 
painless way for the main players to exit the Bretton Woods II scenario. Even more 
worrying, the longer this ‘balance’ is maintained, the more problematic the eventual exit 
becomes. 
 
Potential Landings: What is at Stake? What is Necessary? 
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As soon as Asian official financing of US deficits ends, the long-awaited correction of the 
dollar is guaranteed. However, for the US external deficit to be significantly reduced, the 
dollar will likely need to experience another 15% to 30% real effective depreciation 
(implying a much greater nominal depreciation against the yuan, the yen and the other 
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Asian currencies). Such a steep depreciation –which could be even more severe should the 
dollar collapse in a speculative, panic-driven overshoot– would likely begin to feed 
through to domestic price inflation in the US, placing upward pressure on US interest 
rates. Interest rates would face further upward pressure as official and private foreign 
financing of US deficits dried up in the face of increasing capital losses on US assets and 
declining expected real returns as a result of rising inflation and collapsing growth rates 
which such an interest rate shock could easily produce.23 The impact on the world 
economy would be magnified by the deflationary pressures in Asia implied by stronger 
exchange rates. 
 
If Asia –particularly China and Japan– would naturally think twice before withdrawing 
official financing of the US twin deficits, the US faces similar deterrents to pursuing 
otherwise sensible policy designed to rein in the current account deficit, reduce 
consumption and increase savings –and subsequently wean the US economy of this new 
Bretton Woods II dependency–. All of the policy options open to the US administration 
that might lead to such a result (tighter monetary policy or tighter fiscal policy) imply 
significantly slower US growth, possibly exacerbated by a bursting of the housing market 
bubble and the increased burden of heavy consumer debt in a higher interest rate 
environment. On the other hand, because China depends to a large degree on US 
consumption to fuel its rapid export-led growth, any such US slowdown would reverberate 
through the world economy via its recessionary impact on China and eventually make US 
current account correction that much more difficult as world demand –already weak 
everywhere outside North America and Asia– slumps. 
 
The risk of such a messy exit from Bretton Woods II to flexible rates –a destabilising 
breakdown of the ‘balance of financial terror’– increases the longer the exit is delayed. 
This, therefore, increases the importance of preparing for the exit in the meantime while 
the current scenario is maintained and increases the necessity of brokering a broad 
international agreement to manage the exit. To be sure, however, the world economy will 
eventually ‘exit’ from the status quo scenario. Exit via policy coordination at least has the 
chance to minimise the severity of the correction, while uncontrolled exit increases the 
likelihood of an uncontrolled and messy adjustment –a hard landing for the world– with 
unforeseen, if not unimaginable, consequences.24
 
One approach would be to arrange for a new Plaza-like Agreement in which the world’s 
major regional economies agree to engage in the particular reforms which would produce 
the desired adjustment effects. Most of the commentators contemplating such a scenario 
would argue that the US must commit to a significant reduction of its budget deficit, that 
Europe engage in reforms designed to increase the flexibility of its economy and augment 
its capacity to increase domestic demand, particularly when it must decline in the US, and 
that Asia prepare for more currency flexibility. Indeed, there is at least a broad consensus 
among economists that this would most likely lead to the optimum global result –even if 
some sort of slowdown would still prove inevitable, at least for some time–. 
 
However, such effective multilateral economic policy coordination has been historically 
difficult to achieve and, given the current international climate, there is no reason to 
believe that it would be easier now. Indeed, there are many who believe that such 
coordination is too utopian to consider and that the results of a failed attempt would be 
even more damaging than no attempt at all.25
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Given, then, that most of the players in this game will have to operate largely unilaterally, 
which economy is in the best position to act unilaterally in a way which would help 
achieve a more optimum exit from Bretton Woods II? In our view, this would be the US. If 
the Bush Administration were to unilaterally reduce the budget deficit significantly –
ideally by refusing to make the previous tax cuts permanent and by scrapping its Social 
Security reform as currently conceived– the effect would probably be slower growth in the 
US which no doubt would provoke slower growth in China and the world. However, this 
slowdown would occur with far less upward pressure on interest rates than in the 
alternative scenario in which the US does nothing and a messy exit eventually causes a 
more severe correction in the context of higher interest rates. The difference between these 
two scenarios is not so much the severity of the correction which is felt in the developed 
world, but more the alternative effects on the emerging markets and developing economies 
which are much more sensitive to higher interest rates. In other words, the bulk of the 
adjustment caused by a messy exit from BWII will be disproportionately felt by those who 
always suffer more from world crisis: the vulnerable and the poor. 
 
How will the ‘balance of financial terror’ likely play out? And how might this scenario 
interact with global geopolitics? These questions remain to be dealt with in a subsequent 
paper. 
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